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THE NEW DEAL AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM. By E. W. Haw-
ley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1966. Pp. xv, 525. 
$10. 
The irregularities and upheavals that have appeared at one time 
or another in the economic structure of every nation have generated, 
as might be expected, a plethora of preventive and curative prescrip-
tions. Although the authors of these prescriptions usually agree on 
the ultimate purpose and result to be achieved by their respective• 
plans-economic, social, and political forces operating in harmony 
to the advancement of the populace-they invariably disagree vio-
lently on the route to follow so as to reach these goals. Hence, what 
often appears is a patch quilt of incompatible policies, statutes, and 
bureaus, each challenging the other, so that, in the process of attri-
tion, all are neutralized. 
This country experienced more than its share of these cross-ten-
sions of economic planning during the New Deal era of the 1930's. 
Much has been written in description and analysis of the personali-
ties involved and of the Zeitgeist of the time.1 To the long list, Pro-
fessor Hawley adds "The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly," 
a study of the conflicting schools of thought that influenced and 
shaped New Deal business policy, focusing primarily on the eco-
nomic implications of the interplay between these groups. 
I. 
Postulating that it was universally believed that the Great De-
pression could be traced to the existence of monopolies and cartels, 
Professor Hawley concludes that, to the majority of Americans, the 
obvious solution was a drastic reform of the economic institution. 
Two approaches, each with their vociferous advocates, appeared. 
First, there was the position taken by the antitrusters, that rigid 
and excessively high prices, along with the dilution of consumer 
power, could be erased by decentralizing industrial giants and by 
creating an atmosphere, via stringent antitrust prosecution, in which 
free competition would flourish. The second view favored national 
economic planning, and its adherents were to be found in three dif-
ferent camps: the political left, who believed that planning should 
be the responsibility of the state; a center group, who believed that 
government-business cooperative planning was possible; and those 
planners to the right, who advocated a trade association type of busi-
ness structure. 
All of these divergent views came together under the umbrella 
1. One of the best studies of this period is SCHLESINGER, THE CoMING OF THE NEW 
DEAL (1959). For a recent "insider's" view, see MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL (1966). 
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of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. The act was broad 
enough to appeal to each of the pressure groups and until section 3 
of the act was declared an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 each group strug-
gled to dominate the trend of policy under the banner of the com-
petition ethic. Professor Hawley describes the conflict in the follow-
ing terms (p. 50): 
Because of the strength of this competitive ideal and the neces-
sity of making some gestures towards it, the National Industrial Re-
covery Act was a contradiction in terms from the beginning. Its 
proponents wanted to permit agreements that would violate the 
Sherman Act, yet they could not admit that they would permit 
monopolies or monopolistic practices; and the solution had been a 
clause exempting the proposed codes from the antitrust laws and 
another providing that no code should be so applied as "to permit 
monopolies or monopolistic practices •... " 
Both the economic planners and the antitrusters came away from 
the NRA experience suspicious and, in some cases, contemptuous 
of the other's position. Moreover, both possessed new ideas as to 
how to implement their own policies. Economic planners were to 
adopt a more cautious approach; they set out to attain well-defined 
goals through legislation, to isolate and attack specific problem areas, 
and thus to lay down a regulated economic order in successive stages. 
Antitrusters were convinced that big business' attempts to draft self-
serving codes under the act demonstrated that the monopolistic 
structure of American industry had to be broken down. And finally, 
the business community believed that both approaches were un-
tenable, and businessmen reverted to the tenets of Social Darwinism 
and "rugged individualism" which they interestingly enough ig-
nored in practice, as was evidenced by their joining together in trade 
associations. 
In examining these conflicts, Professor Hawley's book unfortu-
nately pierces only the top layer of a more basic struggle of much 
greater consequence-the doctrines of laissez fa ire engaged in a last-
ditch battle with economic and social reform. The author's failure 
to discuss this underlying conflict was undoubtedly intentional, since 
it would constitute a study in itself.3 Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the New Deal was merely a chapter in a story which began with 
Adam Smith, extended through Spencer's conversion of Darwin's 
theory of evolution into a sociological and economic doctrine, and 
2. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Mr. Chief Justice Hughes complained that "the discretion of 
the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enac;ting laws for the govern-
ment of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered.". Id. at 542. 
3. See generally FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE (1956); 
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN A.MEru:CAN THOUGHT (1955 ed.). 
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finally exploded but did not culminate in the Supreme Court's sharp 
reversal in attitude in 1937. Since 1890, the strongest citadel of laissez 
faire had been the United States Supreme Court;4 using the due 
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the Court 
had consistently struck dmro social and economic reform legislation 
as an interference with the "liberty to contract."5 When the Court 
held unconstitutional a New York law limiting the working hours 
of bakers to ten hours per day, Mr. Justice Holmes in a dissenting 
opinion, objected sharply to what he considered to be the imposi-
tion of laissez fa ire on the nation under the guise of construing the 
Constitution: 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
Social Statics .••. Some of these laws embody convictions or preju-
dices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitu-
tion is not intended to embody a partciular economic theory, whether 
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or 
of laissez faire.6 
Hence, in the last analysis, reform of any type, whether its base of 
support came from antitrusters or economic planners, had to pass 
over the rocks of the laissez faire-oriented attitudes of a majority of 
the Supreme Court. Initial New Deal reforms met defeat,7 but in 
1937, President Roosevelt requested Congress to authorize the ap-
pointment of a new Justice whenever an incumbent failed to retire 
at age seventy,8 and although the President's request was denied, the 
Court's intransigence faded and the success of New Deal legislation, 
along with the demise of constitutional Social Darwinism, was as-
sured. One could make out a good case for the suggestion that the 
most significant feature of the New Deal era was the laying to rest 
of the idea that the principles of laissez faire were implicit in the 
language of the Constitution. 
Until the latter stages of the New Deal, activity under the exist-
ing antitrust laws was muted and overshadowed by the clamor for 
4. I have taken 1890 as the beginning of the era of negation under the due 
process clause. The late Judge Hough .•• was more specific. He dated it from the 
decision of Chicago, Milwaukee &- St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota .... In that case 
the Court decided that in establishing rates for railroads the question of their 
reasonableness cannot be left by the legislature to a state commission, but must be 
subjec;; to judicial review. 
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 50-51 (Vintage ed. 1963). 
5. See Holmes' dissent in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923). 
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
7. For a chart summarizing New Deal legislative failures at the hands of the 
Supreme Court, see JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 181. 
8. In commenting upon the attitude of the Supreme Court, Roosevelt remarked: 
"Little by little, new facts become blurred through old glasses fitted, as it were, for 
the needs of another generation; older men, assuming that the scene is the same as it 
was in the past, cease to explore or inquire into the present or the future." H.R. 
Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937). 
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reform through other avenues. Nevertheless there was some activity, 
and it is unfortunate that the author does not fully• explore the de-
cisions that were handed down by the Supreme Court during this 
period. Between 1933 and 1940 the Supreme Court decided twelve 
cases involving the antitrust laws, eleven of which were concerned 
with Sherman Act violations9 and one with a Clayton Act, section 3 
violation.10 Some of these decisions deserve comment. In 1933, the 
Court allowed 137 bituminous coal producers in the Appalachian 
area to sell through an exclusive selling agency which, among other 
things, set prices and apportioned orders for coal on an arranged 
basis.11 The case is significant in that it represents a retreat from the 
price fixing per se rule of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.12 
Unquestionably, the Court's retreat was due to a recognition that 
the economic circumstances existing in the coal industry were cha-
otic and deplorable. Thus there appears to be substantial contra-
diction between the Court's sensitivity to prevailing economic con-
ditions, as reflected by its opinion in Appalachian Coals, and the 
harsh treatment it was subsequently to give economic reform legis-
lation. However, there are several factors that may resolve the ap-
parent contradiction. First, the Court had already reconciled the 
boundaries of "freedom to contract" and the related concept of prop-
erty rights with the Sherman Act's mandate of free competition: not 
every contract restraining trade is proscribed by section 1 and 
Appalachian Coals was, therefore, merely an expansion of the "rule 
of reason."13 Furthermore, there is a strong indication that the Court 
was embarking upon a task comparable to the journey begun in 
1890 when due process was interpreted, via a substantive reasonable-
ness standard, so as to include the dogma of laissez faire. To Mr. Chief 
Justice Hughes, the crucial "question thus presented chiefly con-
cerns the effect upon prices."14 He concluded that merely because 
"the correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or to pro-
duce fairer price levels, does not mean that ... cooperative endeavor 
to correct them necessarily constitutes an unreasonable restraint of 
9. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); 
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 
306 U.S. 213 (1939); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937); Sugar Institute, Inc. 
v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. 
Prairie Farmer's Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934); Teamsters Local 167 v. United 
States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 288 U.S. 469 
(1933); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 356 (1933). 
10. Intemational Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
11. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 356 (1933). 
12. 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
13. The so-called "rule of reason" was introduced into the antitrust vemacular 
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
14. 288 U.S. at 373. 
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trade."16 Thus it can be argued that as of 1933 the Court, through 
the Sherman Act, intended to pass upon the "reasonableness" of 
prices.16 
But the acquiescense (or retreat) of the Supreme Court in 1937 
to the onslaught of New Deal policy was complete. Thus, in 1940, 
when faced with a case in which the defendants participated in a 
concerted buying program designed to stabilize prices in the oil in-
dustry, the Court abruptly shut the door on a reasonableness of prices 
inquiry.17 Price fixing was held to be unreasonable per se and the 
Court stated that "elimination of so-called competitive evils is no 
legal justification for such buying programs."18 
II. 
The conflicts, theories, and compromises of the New Deal were 
not erased by World War II and its aftermath. Indeed, their residue 
is very much a part of coeval life. For example, the Keynesian fiscal 
spending approach still dominates the economic scene and it was 
in the throes of the New Deal that the concept of countervailing 
power, or "counterorganization" as Professor Hawley labels it, "grad-
ually, haltingly, incoherently, almost haphazardly" appeared (p. 187). 
The essence of the latter theory, as advanced by J. K. Galbraith, is 
simple: "private economic power is held in check by the counter-
vailing power of those who are subject to it."19 While acknowledg-
ing that counterorganization was not the dominant theme of New 
Deal policy, Professor Hawley contends that New Deal programs 
"generated a new organization consciousness among previously weak 
and relatively unorganized groups" (p. 189). In particular, govern-
mental sanctions were applied as a means of developing counter-
vailing power in agriculture and labor. Professor Galbraith, in 
discussing the legacy of the New Deal application of counterorganiza-
tion or countervailing power, perhaps overzealously suggests that 
"in fact, the support of countervailing power has become in modern 
times perhaps the major domestic peacetime function of the federal 
government. "20 
15. Id. at 374. 
16. Writing in 1937, Arthur .Burns said in a discussion of the implications of the 
Appalachian decision: "Apparently in this case the Court, interpreting the Sherman 
Act, has embarked upon a journey towards the control of prices, although that 
control is indirect and tentative." Bums, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation 
of Price Competition, 4 I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 305 (1937). 
17. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
18. Id. at 220. 
19. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF CouNTERVAIUNG POWER 
111 (rev. ed. 1956). 
20. Id. at 136. In a recent case, United Mine ·workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657, 675 (1965), the specter of original power (certain coal producers) combining with 
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Professor Hawley points out that the only group too weak, too 
poorly organized, and too indifferent to the power potential of coun-
terorganization was the consumer. He is correct. Not only did con-
sumers fail as a group to avail themselves of their inherent counter-
vailing bargaining power, but the passage of the Robinson-Patman 
Act21 in 1936 was designed to render impotent the one group (large 
distributors and chains) that had been operating as their "proxy" 
in bargaining confrontations with large manufacturers. Prior to 
Robinson-Patman, mass distributors, developed as a counter to the 
bargaining power possessed by manufacturers, were able to demand 
and obtain price discounts-the savings from which were largely 
passed on to the consumer. 22 
As a legacy of the New Deal, the Robinson-Patman Act has not 
been easy to live with.23 It has been justifiably called "one of the 
most tortuous legislative pronouncements ever to go on the statute 
books."24 Moreover, the act is not compatible with the overall pur-
pose of the antitrust structure. As Donald Turner, the present head 
of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, has written, 
"protection of a certain class of competitors may yield different results 
from protection of the competitive process generally, particularly 
where the protected class is threatened by more efficient tech-
niques."25 And, despite persistent urgings for amendment,26 the com-
plexities and shifting nuances of the Robinson-Patman Act will un-
doubtedly linger on as part of the antitrust fabric. Furthermore, one 
would have to dispute Professor Hawley's conclusion that the "good 
faith meeting of competition" proviso "diluted" the original pur-
pose of the act by providing the Federal Trade Commission and the 
courts with an opportunity to use a "rule of reason" approach (pp. 
countervailing power (the bargaining unions) so as to force less competitive and 
smaller competing coal producers out of business was raised. 
21. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). 
22. See generally FTC, Special Discounts and Allowances to Chain and Indepen-
dent Distributors-Drug Trade, S. Doc. No. 94, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); FTC, Special 
Discounts and Allowances to Chain and Independent Distributors-Grocery Trade, 
S. Doc. No. 89, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); FTC, Special Discounts and Allowances to 
Chain and Independent Distributors-Tobacco Trade, S. Doc. No. 86, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1934). 
23. See generally Eine Kleine ]uristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARv. L. REv. 
921 (1966). 
24. DIRLAM &: KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRusr 
POLICY 119 (1954). 
25. Turner, The American Antitrust Laws, 18 MODERN L. R.Ev. 244, 249 (1955). 
Turner, writing with Professor Kaysen, advocates repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act 
"in favor of a statute dealing separately with (a) price discrimination directed against 
competing sellers and (b) price discrimination that harms particular buyers." KAYSEN 
&: TURNER, .ANTITRUsr POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 47-48 (1959). 
26. See Patman, For H.R. 11 and S. 11 To Strengthen the Robinson-Patman Act 
and Amend the Antitrust Law Prohibiting Price Discrimination, 11 VAND. L. R.Ev. 
399 (1957). 
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266-67). Case law indicates that the boundaries of the section 2(b) 
defense are so obscure as to sharply dissipate its efficacy. In brief, 
the "good faith" defense has proved an inconsequential obstacle to 
prosecution under the Robinson-Patman Act.27 
A significant portion of the book, 200 pages or so, is devoted to 
a summary of attempts to revitalize the economy through the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts. By eliminating abuses, such as price uni-
formity under basing point systems, and by focusing prosecution 
upon specific non-competitive industries, such as the movie industry, 
the antitrusters hoped to provide an atmosphere where competitive 
forces would operate so as to place a premium on efficiency and con-
sumer welfare. It was very clearly a negation of national economic 
planning. Thurman Arnold, who was in charge of antitrust prose-
cution from 1938 to 1943, and was the chief architect of this form 
of attack on the ills of the economy was, according to Professor 
Hawley, "never ... greatly concerned about the mere possession of 
economic power or the so-called evils of bigness per se" (p. 428). To 
him, "large organizations, as long as they were efficient and passed 
along the savings to consumers, were desirable" (p. 428). Arnold's 
approach, which was to prohibit conduct that interferred with nor-
mal market patterns, seemed to echo the mood of the thirties. 
Certainly the Sherman and Clayton Acts were designed to reach 
specified types of conduct, but it is interesting to note that in the 
post-war period the prevailing concern has been with size and the 
powers that flow from the "rising tide of economic concentration in 
the American economy."28 The anti-merger act was strengthened in 
1950.29 Recent cases indicate that the standards of proof necessary 
for successful prosecution in merger cases might be less stringent 
than those previously required,80 and Antitrust Division chief Tur-
ner has revealed a plan to curtail market power and reduce indus-
trial concentration.31 Consequently, it appears that we are witness-
ing a shift in the direction of antitrust policy. Using the flexibility 
of the language in the antitrust repertory, 32 ( or taking advantage of 
what Professor Julius Stone calls "categories of illusory reference")38 
27. See Austin, Robinson-Patman and Meeting Competition: A Myriad of Prob-
lems With No Solutions, 40 Tut. L. REv. 313 (1966). 
28. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). 
29. Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). 
30. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. 
Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966); see Hale &: Hale, Delineating the Geographic 
Market: A Problem in Merger Cases, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 538 (1966). 
31. KAYSEN &: TURNER, op. cit. supra note 25. 
32. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes noted that "the Sherman Act, as a charter of freedom, 
has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in consti-
tutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions." Sugar Institute, Inc. v. 
United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936). 
33. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REAsoNINGS 235-300 (1964), 
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courts are mirroring a general concern with concentration by taking 
a harsh stand against any type of activity that might lead to further 
market consolidation. 
Professor Hawley concludes by remarking that "current pol-
icy ... , like that of the New Deal era, is still a maze of conflicting 
cross-currents ..• " (p. 492)- He doubts that consistent policies will 
ever be established. His assessment is undoubtedly correct; but per-
haps this lack of unity is desirable. All the different approaches-
antitrust, fair trade, Keynesian fiscal policy, national planning, etc. 
-serve as "countervailing" forces and thus prevent a single and 
more than likely oppressive and coercive system from dominating 
the economic scene. 
In any event, Professor Hawley is to be commended for his ex-
ploration of the monopoly problems of the New Deal era. His study 
serves as an informative background against which to view con-
temporary problems. 
Arthur D. Austin, 
Assistant Professor of Law, 
Cleveland-Marshall Law 
School of Baldwin-Wal-
lace College. 
